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INTRODUCTION

In the rapidly changing world of personal computer software, the
end user license agreement ("EULA") has endured. The EULA is
a familiar component of most personal computer software transac-

tions.' Many commentators, however, have maligned the practice
of standard form software licensing. A survey of the literature on
the subject might lead one to conclude that there are only critics--and no proponents--of EULAs. 2
Despite the din of criticism, EULAs continue to be widely used
by almost every mass-market software publisher, even though the

1. See discussion infra part II (discussing the various forms that EULAs
take).
2. See, e.g., Christopher Celentino et al., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software,
Ltd.: InvalidatingShrink-Wrap Licenses?,2 J.L. & TECH. 151 (1987); David A.
Einhom, Box-Top Licenses and the Battle-of-the-Forms,5 SOFTWARE L.J. 401
(1992) [hereinafter Einhom, Box-Top Licenses]; David A. Einhom, The
Enforceability of Tear-Me-Open Software License Agreements, 67 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 509 (1985) [hereinafter Einhom, Tear-Me-Open
SoftwareLicenseAgreements];GaryW. Hamilton & Jeffrey C. Hood, The ShrinkWrap License-Is it Really Necessary?, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1993, at 16;
Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraintson Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the
FeudalNatureofComputerSoftware Licensing,71 DENV. U. L. REv. 577 (1994);
Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualPropertyand Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1239, 1241 (1995); David W. Maher, The Shrink-Wrap License: Old
Problems in a New Wrapper, 34 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 292 (1987); Steven A.
Marenberg & Elliot Brown, "Scope of Use" Restrictionsin Software Licenses,
COMPUTER LAW., Dec. 1993, at 1; Michael Schwartz, Tear-Me Open Software
License Agreements: A Uniform CommercialCode Perspectiveon an Innovative
Contractof Adhesion, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 261 (1986); Graham P. Smith, ShrinkWrap Licenses in EuropeAfter the EC Software Directive,11 COMPUTER L.J. 597
(1992); Richard H. Stem, Licenses of Mass MarketedSoftware: Enforceable
Contractsor Whistling in the Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 51
(1985); Karen Puhala, Note, The Protectionof Computer Software Through
Shrink-WrapLicenseAgreements,42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1347 (1985). But see
Fred M. Greguras & Sandy J. Wong, Software LicensingFlexibilityComplements
the Digital Age, COMPUTER LAW., Dec. 1994, at 15; James T. Peys, Note,
CommercialLaw-TheEnforceabilityofComputer"Box-Top" LicenseAgreements
Under the UC.C., 7 WHTHER L. REv. 881 (1985); Michael Ryan, Note, Offers
Users Can't Refuse: Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as EnforceableAdhesion
Contracts, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2105 (1989).
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cost of doing so is significant. This Article explains the value of
EULAs for both software publishers and users, and why EULAs
will be even more valuable for distributing the rich variety of
information products available on the "information superhighway."
Given the benefits provided by EULAs, courts and legislatures
should seek to validate their use. 4 This perspective is particularly
significant in light of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute's efforts

3. Hemnes, supra note 2, at 577. Producing and distributing a EULA
consumes many resources, including in-house lawyer and paralegal time, outside
counsel fees, product management efforts, manufacturing, foreign language
translation, layout and printing, and the materials on which the EULA is printed.
Id.; see also DAVtD BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 4A. 141 (1994) (discussing legal
costs involved in creating "shrinkwrap contracts"); Michael Rustad et al., An
Empirical Analysis of Software Licensing Law and Practice, 10 COMPUTER L.
ASS'N BULL. 8 (1995).
4. Recently, a number of courts have declined to enforce EULAs. See
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,651 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (invalidating
a scope of use restriction in a EULA between an end user and a database
licensor); see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91,
98 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding a EULA warranty disclaimer unenforceable in a
transaction between a retail store and a software publisher); Arizona Retail Sys.,
Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding a
EULA enforceable in the initial transaction between a value-added retailer and a
software publisher, but unenforceable in a subsequent transaction); Robert B.
Mitchell, Restoring Realism in Software Licensing Law, MULTIMEDIA & TECH.
LICENSING L. REP., Apr. 1996, at A4 (criticizing the ProCD, Step-Saver, and
Arizona Retail line of cases as a stark departure from the "legal realist" roots of
the U.C.C.).
The district court's ruling in ProCDdemonstrates how farjudicial interpretation
of EULAs departs from commercial reality in software transactions. The end user
in ProCDwas notified four separate times (on the product package, in the user
guide, upon installation of the software, and prior to gaining access to the
product's data) that use of the software was subject to the EULA. ProCD, 908
F. Supp. at 652. The end user's explanation for violating the EULA was not that
he was unaware of it, and not that he would have foregone purchasing the product
had he known about the EULA, but that he thought it was unenforceable (i.e.,
essentially a legalconclusion). Id. Contract law does not allow what amounts to
unjust enrichment. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1995) (stating that general equitable
principles apply to contracts); U.C.C. § 1-203 (noting that every contract imposes
obligation of good faith in its performance); U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (stating that a
contract's terms are supplemented by usage of trade); U.C.C. § 2-206(a) & § 2206 cmt. 1 (stating that an offeror may invite acceptance in any manner

reasonable under the circumstances);
§ 221 (1981) (same).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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to draft an article of the Uniform Commercial Code which
addresses software licensing (currently referred to as "U.C.C.

Article 2B").5
This Article first introduces the various forms EULAs take, and
then explains the main advantages of EULAs. It argues that
EULAs provide valuable information to end users, and that EULAs
permit software publishers to offer the wide variety of rights that
are associated with the features of today's software products. This
Article further explains why the ability to offer a variety of rights
in a EULA will be even more important for the information
products of the future. This Article concludes by proposing
methods for improving how EULAs are used in the software
contracting process.
II.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS,
PAST AND PRESENT

Most early software development focused on the creation of
customized software for mainframe computers and mini comput-

5. As noted in the Reporter's preface to Draft Article 2B:
Much has been written about whether software does or does not come
within the definition of goods in Article 2 and particular areas of dispute
continue to exist in the current case law. In a law reform context,
however, this is not the proper question. We deal with how intangibles
should be dealt with in contract law.
Raymond T. Nimmer, ARTICLE 2B PREFACE: MEETING THE INFORMATION AGE,
vi (Dec. 1, 1995). In that spirit, this Article examines the virtues of EULAs and
proposes that contract law should validate them. See discussion infra part III
(discussing the value of EULAs). See generallyBRUCEA. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TiE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, THE REPORT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 58 (1995) (stating

that a software transaction may not be a sale, but rather a license to use or access
the work, and therefore, should be scrutinized with common law contract
analysis); Raymond T. Nimmer, CommercialLicensingAdaptsto InformationAge,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at C16 (pointing out that, at present, the U.C.C. is
"hard goods centric" and needs to be transformed to be applied to information
products); Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License ContractsUnder Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal,19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
281, 283 (1993) (outlining proposed changes to Article 2 of the U.C.C. that "may
be desirable in accommodating software contracts").
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ers.6 Contracts for this type of custom software were few, and
involved two readily identifiable contracting parties.7 This model
changed when personal computers and their accompanying software
became mass market items.' To be useful in the mass market,
software license agreements could not be individually negotiated,
and had to be standardized and concise.9 The software license
agreement needed to be presented to the customer in a fashion that
would allow for mass distribution of software, yet would draw the
customer's attention to the conditions under which the publisher
offered to allow use of the software.'"
By far, the most commonly used EULAs are of the "shrinkwrap"
or "break the seal" variety." EULAs in this form are printed on
product packaging, a diskette or CD-ROM container (such as an

6. See BENDER, supra note 3, § 4A. 141 (stating that originally, there were
only mainframe computers and customized software programs, which cost the
typical user tens of thousands of dollars).
7. See id (explaining that mainframe software contracts usually involved two
corporations negotiating through their lawyers, with the terms of the contract
unique to each transaction).
8. See generally BENDER, supranote 3, §§ 4A-141 to -142 (discussing that
with the development of mass market, low cost software, it became prohibitive to
have contracts signed between vendors and purchasers); Hamilton & Hood, supra
note 2, at 16 (stating that with the expansion of mass market computer software,
users have little or no contact with the software developer); Schwartz, supra note
2, at 261-62 (discussing how logistical problems in getting signed agreements
from users of mass market software led to the development of "tear-me-open"
agreements).
9. See Hamilton & Hood, supra note 2, at 16 (discussing the logistical
problems involved in mass market software and the ways in which shrinkwrap
licenses have addressed them); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary
Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License
Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479, 495 (1995) ("In the case of mass market software,
usually distributed for use with high-volume hardware like personal computers
(PCs), licensors cannot practically incur the huge transaction costs that would be
involved if they attempted to negotiate with every licensee.").
10. See Lloyd L. Rich, Mass Market Software and the Shrinkwrap License,
23 COLO. LAW. 1321 (1994) (discussinghow shrinkwrap licenses for mass market
software have been developed to inform purchasers of the conditions under which
they can use the software).
11. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1241 n.5 (noting that, while it is not clear
who started the trend, shrinkwrap licenses were "part of the licensing landscape
of the early 1980's"); Peys, supra note 2, at 882 n.9 (discussing the contents of
typical "box-top" or "shrinkwrap" licenses).

340

RUTGERS COMPUTER

& TECHNOLOGY LAW

JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

envelope or a plastic case), a card inside the package, or a page of
the user manual. 2 The user is asked to "accept" the terms of the
agreement by performing a certain action designated on the
package or in the EULA, such as tearing open the plastic wrapper
covering the box, breaking the seal on the diskette container,
sending a self-addressed, stamped card back to the software
publisher, or installing or using the software. 3 The user can
refuse to enter into the agreement by returning the software product
for a complete refund. 4
When publishers of software operating systems began distributing their software by pre-loading it on computer hard disks, they
had to find different ways to allow the user to "accept" the
license.' 5 Some software publishers place, near the computer's
"on/off" switch, a notice stating that the user accepts the terms of
the license--usually printed on a sticker beside the switch, on an
accompanying card, or in the user manual-by flipping the switch
to the "on" position. Other publishers attach a notice to the
computer system's power cord stating that the end user accepts the
accompanying license terms by plugging in the power cord and

12. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1241 (describing shrinkwrap licenses
consisting of a single sheet of paper wrapped in plastic along with computer
disks); Rich, supra note 10, at 1327 (referring to shrinkwrap licenses as
documents connected to the software in a manner such that the purchaser will
notice and read the license prior to use); Michael D. Scott, FrontierIssues:
Pitfallsin Developingand MarketingMultimedia Products, 13 CARDozo ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 413,444 (1995) (discussinghow terms of the agreement are accepted
by opening the software packaging or using the software).
13. See Hamilton & Hood, supra note 2, at 16-17 (describing shrinkwrap
agreements that bind the purchaser when the purchaser opens the software
packaging); Lemley, supranote 2, at 1241 (describing acceptances of shrinkwrap
licenses by using the software); Schwartz, supra note 2, at 262 (describing
shrinkwrap agreements that bind the purchaser once the shrinkwrap is removed
from the software package).
14. See Hamilton & Hood, supra note 2, at 16-17 (discussing how common
shrinkwrap agreements allow for full refunds if the software is returned prior to
the package being opened).
15. See Joel R. Wolfson, Information Transactions on the Information
Superhighway: It's Not Just Software Law Anymore, 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2
(1994) (noting that users who bought computers that contain pre-loaded software
receive disk packages that have already been opened, resulting in no shrinkwrap
to tear open).
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booting up the computer.
Software publishers began to experiment with presenting EULAs
via media other than paper to make the license agreement more
conspicuous to the software user. 16 One popular method displays
the EULA on the computer screen the first time a user operates the
software.' 7 The user can then accept the EULA's terms by
pressing a certain key, clicking on a "yes" button icon, or taking
some other specified action."
Presenting EULAs via the computer screen is especially
important now that more software is being distributed electronically. For example, programs can be distributed to a users's desktop
computer from a server over a local area network, and can be
downloaded from computer bulletin boards and World Wide Web
sites. 9 For this form of distribution, the EULA often appears on
the potential user's screen before the software is downloaded to the
user. If the user assents to the on-screen EULA (usually by typing
"yes" or "I accept," clicking on an icon with similar words, or
simply pressing the "Enter" key), the user may install the software.
Software publishers thus rely on a variety of forms of EULAs
in adapting their contracting practices to rapid changes in software
technology and distribution.
III.
A.

THE VALUE OF EULAS

EULAs Are Efficient for Mass Market Distribution

One important benefit of EULAs is that they promote efficient
Many personal computer software
software transactions."

16. See, e.g., Hamilton & Hood, supra note 2, at 16 (discussing the practice
of having licensing agreements appear on computer screens when the software is
first installed).
17. See id
18. See id (discussing that the user is requested to verify that he or she agrees
to the terms of the license).
19. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological
Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275, 348-49 (1989) (describing how computer users can
now download software from computer bulletin boards).
20. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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publishers distribute their works on a mass market scale. 2' For
broad distribution, individually negotiated contracts are not feasible,
and the EULA is an efficient tool to set the terms for the standard,
22
mass market transaction.

Software publishers benefit from significant economies of scale
in the development of software that can be distributed on a mass
market basis.23 For example, if a new software program costs
$100,000,000 to develop and publish, and 1,000,000 end users
acquire a copy, the publisher needs to receive only $100 per copy
to recover its development and publishing costs. 24 Mass distribution allows users to obtain licenses for sophisticated and expensive
software at relatively low prices.25 The software publisher,
however, can offer products at such low prices only if each
transaction has very low transaction costs. 26 The uniform terms
of EULAs facilitate high-volume distribution without the cost of
individually negotiating individual licenses.27

21. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 261. Indeed, to qualify for distribution by
national software retailers such as Egghead Software, a software product must
have a projected distribution of thousands of copies.
22. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits ofExpanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 295 (1985) (contrasting mainframe and microcomputer software transactions and discussing the benefits of EULAs).
23. See Darren J. Carroll, When More is Less: Controlling the Market for
Computer Software Enhancements,43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1321, 1324-25, 1345-46
(1992) (discussing the ways in which economies of scale affect software markets).
24. See Stewart Brand, The Physicist, WIRED, Sept., 1995, at 152, 154
(interview of Nathan Myhrvold, Group Vice-President, Applications and Content
Group, Microsoft Corporation).
25. See generally Robert G. Sterne & Edward J. Kessler, An Overview of
Software Copying Policies in CorporateAmerica, I J.L. & TECH. 157, 160 (1986)
(discussing how mass market software allows publishers to recoup their high
development costs by selling many copies, thus avoiding costs for specialized
programs).
26. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 783 (1995) (discussing economies of scale and
the basic model of and costs associated with the marketing and sale of a software
product).
27. See O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 495 ("The shrink wrap thus serves as a
shorthand for essentially those terms negotiated in the custom software context,
in which transaction costs are low enough to facilitate the face to face bargaining
that is impractical in the mass market."). Some argue that the most efficient
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The Restatement of Contracts asserts that "standardization of
agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization
of goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass
production and distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill can
be devoted to a class of transactions rather than to the details of
individual transactions."2
Although EULAs are most likely "contracts of adhesion," they
are neither unusual nor pernicious. The vast majority of contracts
in the United States are adhesion contracts,2 9 and any rule
automatically invalidating them would be unworkable.3" In this
respect, software EULAs are no different from most other mass
market contracts, including contracts that are actually signed.
Parties seldom, if ever, negotiate the contracts they sign to rent a
video, to acquire a credit card, or to borrow money to purchase a
home. In reality, a negotiated contract is atypical in the mass

method of distributing software is with no EULA at all, by simply relying on the
copyright doctrine of first sale and other intellectual property rights. This,
however, is not an effective model for most software transactions. See discussion
infra part III.B.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a(1981). Coordination, record-keeping, and supervision are streamlined by usingone document-the
EULA-for all transactions. Id.Personnel can focus on major points of the sale
instead of molding less significant details for each transaction, and can learn
common routines tailored to repeated mass transactions, thereby maximizing
efficiency. See id
29. See I JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4. (rev. ed. 1993)
("[The contract of adhesion is part of the fabric of our society. It should neither
be praised nor denounced by the legal scholar. It must be analyzed and studied.");
see also Todd D. Radkoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1218-25 (1983). See generallyCALAMAPJ ET AL., CASES
AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (1989) (stating that examples of everyday

adhesion contracts are parking lot tickets, theater tickets, package receipts, credit
card slips, and gas station credit card slips).
30. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 559A(B) (rev.
ed. Supp. 1994) (noting the trend in courts accepting adhesion contracts); see also
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-44 (3d
ed. 1987) (same); 1E.A. FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 4.26-.27
(1990) (same). Adhesion contracts help a mass market economy by simplifying
transactions and reducing coststhrough simplification. See 1PERILLO, supranote
29, § 1.4. We could hardly function as a fast-paced, industrialized nation if every
term in every agreement had to be negotiated. See I id.
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market context; most transactions are "take it or leave it."'"
The face-to-face negotiation model that prevails in purchases of
mainframe software and hardware 2 would work poorly in
purchasing or distributing personal computer software.3 ' The
typical potential user of packaged word processing software has no
more time or inclination to sit down and negotiate a contract for
this product than he or she does when purchasing a microwave
oven. Most users would likely prefer to retain the costs software
publishers can save by licensing software under standard license
agreements, instead of actually trying to bargain with the publisher

31. In determining whether to enforce an adhesion contract, courts generally
balance the "fairness" to the consumer with the commercial justification for
presentation of the agreement as an adhesion contract. See 3 PERILLO, supra note
30, § 559A(B) (stating that courts should review adhesion contracts for fairness,
"and refuse to enforce those adhesion terms which are demonstrably unfair to the
stuck party"); Bank of Indiana, N.A. v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109 (S.D.
Miss. 1979) (refusing to enforce an adhesion choice of law clause for Kentucky
law to control because "it is far more reasonable for Mississippilaw to control this
lawsuit"); Shields v. Sta-Fit, Inc., 903 P.2d 525, 530-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(upholding exculpatory clause in a contract of adhesion); Ryan, supranote 2, at
2119, 2123-25, 2127-35.
EULAs should be enforced because, even though they are adhesion contracts,
software publishers do a good job making them "fair." EULAs are "fair" because:
(1) use of EULAs is a well-known practice in software transactions, so an end
user is not surprised by use of this form of contract; (2) software publishers use
reasonable efforts to bring the EULA to the user's attention, and will be able to
do an even better job as technology allows; (3) software publishers seek some
manifestation of assent to the terms of the EULA; (4) software publishers allow
users to return the product if they disagree with the terms; (5) negotiated licenses
are uneconomical for mass market distribution; and (6) software publishers
compete on the basis of the often varying license terms. See discussion infrapart
III.C. In other words, software publishers actually do a good job of making
EULAs "fair" by bringing them to the user's attention, getting the user to give
some indication that he or she had a chance to review the terms and agree to
them, and giving the user recourse if the user decides to "leave it" rather than
"take it." See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 4.26; 3 PERILLO, supranote 30,
§ 559A.
32. See Goetz & Scott, supranote 22, at 294; supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
33. See Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequencesof the Weak
Connection Between Copyrightand the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHo ST.
L.J. 1343, 1371 n.131 (1991) (discussing the difference between shrinkwrap
licenses and agreements reached in face-to-face negotiations); supranotes 6-8 and
accompanying text.
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for a lower price or different license terms.34
Rather than relying on their own negotiating skills or knowledge
of the relevant law, most users are better served by relying on the
contract doctrine of unconscionability," the contract principle that
agreements should be construed against the drafter,3 6 the copyright doctrine of misuse," consumer protection laws,38 , and the
intense competition within the software market to obtain advantageous terms in acquiring software.39 The personal computer
software market has been particularly unforgiving of companies
that try to license software on unreasonable terms.4" The infor-

34. SeeAlan Schwartz, A ReexaminationofNonsubstantiveUnconscionability,
63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1064-65 (1977); cf W. David Slawson, The New Meaning
of Contract: The TransformationofContractLaw by StandardTerms, 46 PITT. L.

REv. 21, 24-26 (1984) (arguing that standardization actually increases consumer
understanding of contract terms by reducing the number of new terms).
35. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 4.28 (describing the equitable
concept of unconscionability in contract law that allows courts to refuse to
recognize contracts or contract provisions if they are found to be unconscionable);

Lemley, supranote 2, at 1254-55 (examining the doctrine of unconscionability as
applied to shrinkwrap agreements); see also BENDER, supra note 3, § 4A.02[41
(noting that U.C.C. § 2-301 raises questions regarding the unconscionability of
shrinkwrap agreements).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 206 (1981) ("In choosing

among the reasonable means of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that
meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the
words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."); see also 1 FARNSWORTH,

supranote 30, § 4.24 (discussing the concept of interpreting contracts in favor of
the non-drafting party).

37. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that misuse of a copyright is a valid defense in copyright infringement
actions involving computer software).
SOFTWARE
38. See DAvID F. SIMON, COMPUTER LAW HANDBOOK:
PROTECTION CONTRACTS LITIGATION FORMS § 8.03 (1990) (noting that consumer
protection laws may thwart enforceability of licensing agreements).
39. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board
Operatorsfor Infringementby Subscribers,1 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. 6 (1996) ("In
a competitive market form contract terms may simply reflect the terms the parties
would have agreed to had they expressly negotiated a contract."). See generally
I FARNSWORTH, supranote 30, § 4.26 (discussingthe advantages of standardized
agreements).
40. See Greguras & Wong, supra note 2, at 15 (stating that "[t]he U.S.

software industry is moving toward licensing practices that are more flexible and
pricing methods that reflect the value of software to individual users"); Carol
Hildebrand, Rigid Licensing Draws WordPerfect Users' Ire, COMPUTERWORLD,
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mation superhighway magnifies the negative public relations consequences for software publishers who are perceived as behaving
badly; 41 criticism on the Internet and on computer bulletin boards
is swift, blunt, caustic, and spreads quickly.42 Software end users
have even formed associations to monitor and influence the license
terms offered by software publishers.4 3 As one user association
official explained, "[l]icensing issues cannot be a barrier to
new technologies. If so, it's only the vendors who will
accepting
44
suffer."

B.

EULAs Are Informative

EULAs place valuable information in the hands of end users.
This attribute is overlooked by some critics of EULAs, who assert
'
According to
that EULAs are essentially a "waste of paper."45
secret
laws already
patent,
and
trade
copyright,
this criticism,
adequately define end users' rights to software products, and

Aug. 5, 1991, at 29 (discussing the adverse effects of Wordperfect Corporation's
strict licensing upon the customer); Carol Hildebrand, Users Warm to Changes in
WordPerfect's Fees, COMPUTERWORLD. Nov. 4, 1991, at 6 (reporting how
WordPerfect Corporation changed its licensing policy in response to market
pressures); Lauren G. Paul, Tug-of-War-UserGroupsLeverageClout to Influence
Agreements, PC WK., Nov. 7, 1994, at 21, 24 (reporting how user groups of large
end users force "more enlightened licensing agreements").
41. See, e.g., BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 161-63,211-12,271-72 (1995).
42. See Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challengesto the FirstAmendment in Cyberspaces,104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1656-64
(1995) (detailing examples of quick and harsh self-regulation of aberrant behavior
by members of the on-line community).
43. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 40, at 21 (identifying two user groups who
monitor software licensing terms for their members).
44. Carol Hildebrand, White Paper Urges More Liberal Software Licenses,
COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 7, 1991, at 4 (quoting Jeffrey Knepper, director of tax
technology at Deloitte & Touche). Ms. Hildebrand further reported that:
Personal computer managers ... sent a loud, clear message to the
vendor community: More liberal software licensing is the direction
of the future, and those refusing to comply do so at their own risk.
"It's pretty simple-if you don't like the licensing, don't buy the
software .... It will have an effect on the company's sales."
Id. (quoting Jeffrey Knepper, director of tax technology at Deloitte & Touche).
45. See Hamilton & Hood, supranote 2, at 22 ("[Tlhe restrictions imposed
by shrink-wrap licenses are ... unnecessary when viewed in light of the
protection provided by federal copyright laws .... ").
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provide ample protection for software publishers.46 EULA critics,
therefore, suggest that software publishers should stop using
EULAs and rely solely on general intellectual property laws.47
This position ignores the basic educational and informative benefits
of using EULAs in the mass market.4
Proponents of not using EULAs fail to recognize that most
purchasers of mass market software have little knowledge of their
rights under copyright law. Most of these customers have probably

46. See, e.g., id (concluding that existing law provides sufficient protection
for software publishers). This criticism was arguably bolstered by the 1990 Rental
Amendments to the Copyright Act. Id. One of the gaps in copyright law that
initially led software publishers to employ EULAs was an end user's right to rent
or lease the software under the "doctrine of first sale." Computer Software
Rentals Amendment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5134, (codified
as amended in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 109).
Software rental was-and still is-often a front for software piracy. See Judith
K. Smith, The Computer Software Rental Act: Amending the "First Sale
Doctrine"to ProtectComputerSoftware Copyright,20 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1613,
1615 (1987). With a wink and a nod, software rental establishments encourage
their clients to make illegal copies of the rented software, often providing the
computers and diskettes on site for doing so. See Neal Chatterjee, Symposium:
FirstAmendment and the Media: RegulatingInteractiveCommunicationson the
InformationSuperhighway, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. & MEDIA ENT. L.J. 383,
402 (1995); Smith, supra, at 1615 ("The great demand for software programs
coupled with their high cost makes software copying an attractive alternative to
purchasing the programs. The availability of computer software which can be
rented at a fraction of its purchase price facilitates software copying.").
A 1990 amendment to the Copyright Act, however, prohibits the owner or
possessor of a copy of a computer program from renting, leasing, or lending the
copy for commercial advantage without the express authority of the copyright
owner. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b). Some argue that this eliminates the primary reason
for software publishers needing to license copies of their products rather than sell
them. Hamilton & Hood, supra note 2, at 18.
In fact, the software rental legislation makes EULAs more valuable because the
software publisher may use EULAs to permit certain forms of rental. Moreover,
EULAs are an important means of informing customers that rental is not
permitted. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
47. See Hamilton & Hood, supra note 2, at 22 ("The availability of...
protections is clear and enough questions as to their scope and coverage have been
answered to indicate that the restrictions included in a typical shrink-wrap
agreement are no longer desirable.").
48. See O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 487-90 (explaining the need to inform
software end users of their rights, in contrast to purchasers of traditional hard copy
printed materials).
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never heard of the doctrine of first sale,49 the doctrine of fair
use, 50 or section 117 of the Copyright Act." Without a document from the software publisher explaining their rights, typical
users would lack the knowledge required to take advantage of the
range of rights2 which software users, in theory, have under
5
copyright law.
Unsophisticated end users also lack information describing what
copyright law does not allow them to do with software. For
example, most software purchasers could not differentiate between
an impermissible public and a permissible private performance or
display,53 or distinguish a "fair use" from an infringing use.54

49. See infra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of first
sale).
50. See infranote 54 and accompanying text (defining the fair use doctrine).
51. For example, section 117 of the Copyright Act authorizes persons who
acquire copies of software programs to make certain "essential step" copies and
adaptations, and further to create and store archival copies of the software. 17
U.S.C. § 117(1) (1994). Section 117 further requires, however, that such copies
be transferred only in conjunction with all other rights in the program. Id.
52. The foregoing comments might lead one to conclude that software
publishers should dispense with the contractual aspect of EULAs and instead
simply include detailed notices of proprietary rights in their software products.
Although this model is workable for some software products, EULAs provide
benefits for many software products. See O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 487-88
(explaining why software publishers license software in contrast to publishers of
traditional printed material); infra part III.C. Moreover, understanding the
copyrights associated with software such as multimedia products is complicated-even for lawyers practicing in the field--and the exact scope of a purchaser's
rights may depend upon how the work is characterized (i.e., as a film or a book).
Lawyers, therefore, often debate the question of "what is" the essence of a given
work under copyright law. Employing a EULA essentially eliminates the need for
this debate by explaining to the end user which rights are available for use.
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (outlining exclusive rights possessed by
copyright owners for various public performances or displays).
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Section 107 states, in relevant part, that:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by
[17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 106A], for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
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Many end users do not know whether they may rent the software
which they have acquired."
Moreover, EULAs play an important role in curbing software
piracy.5 6 Despite the attempts of software industry groups to
teach the public that copying a software program onto a second
computer is equivalent to stealing a second copy of the program,
many people still confuse the ease with which one can copy with
a right to copy.57 EULAs inform end users that making extra
copies is not permitted (except for backup purposes) and that the
software publisher is serious enough about enforcing this point to
provide a written notice.5

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id.; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994)
(noting that the more "transformative"--or altered-the work is, the more likely
fair use will be found); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 433 (1984) ("[A]nyone who is authorized by the copyright owner to use
the copyrighted work in away specified in [17 U.S.C. § 106] or who makes a fair
use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.");
D.C. Toedt, Oh Pretty Woman: Muddying Software CopyrightEven Furtherwith
"TransformativeFair Use, " COMPuTER LAW., June, 1994, at 15.
55. See, e.g., Central Point Software, Inc., v. Global Software & Accessories,
Inc., 880 F. Supp. 957, 963-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (analyzing a software agreement
under the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 and finding that
a rental company's deferred billing plan under which customers made small down
payments and were charged if they did not return the software within five days
was rental of software in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 109).
56. See Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses, supranote 2, at 402 (describing the use
of box-top licenses (EULAs) as a means of discouraging piracy and unauthorized
rentals of software); see also Otis Port, Copyright's New Digital Guardian, Bus.
WK., May 6, 1996, at 62 (describing how encrypted contracts will be a tool used
to curb software piracy on the Internet); supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57. See Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses, supra note 2, at 402 ("According to
current estimates by the Software Publishers Association, there exists one
unauthorized copy for every legally-purchased software package in the United
States."). According to the Business Software Alliance, software publishers lost
$15.2 billion in revenue in 1994 because of software piracy. See THE IMPACT OF
SOFTWARE PIRACY ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (Business Software
Alliance Annual Survey 1995).
58. See Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses,supranote 2, at 402. Mr. Einhorn wrote
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EULAs often grant rights that the user would not receive as a
purchaser of a copy of the software under copyright law's doctrine
of first sale. 9 In some cases, these rights may seem obvious-the
rights to reproduce and to print "clip art" provide examples in
which, arguably, end users could proceed under an implied license
theory.6" Describing license terms in a written record, however,
informs end users of their "extra" rights more clearly than does an
implied license.6
A written EULA also explains licensing
arrangements that are more complex than those for which the user
simply loads the software into a computer and uses it. For more

In an attempt to discourage unauthorized copying, software publishers
typically include in their box-top agreements terms which grant endusers only a nonexclusive, nonassignable, and nontransferable right to
operate the program on a single computer system and which prohibit
any copying of the computer program for any reason without the written
authorization of the software publisher.
Id.
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994) (outlining the effect of a transfer of
copyrighted material); see also Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,
38 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1994) (giving a thorough analysis of the first sale
doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315
(1995); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1991) (same), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992); infra note 74 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 556-58 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding an implied license to incorporate footage into a movie), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991).
61. Relying on an implied license is problematic for both licensees and
licensors. See, e.g., MacLean Assoc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc.,
952 F.2d 769, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing the district court's directed verdict
that defendant had an implied license in the computer software). The scope of an
implied license is often in doubt. See, e.g., I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768,
776 (7th Cir. 1996) (deciding whether a dispute over an implied license to an
architect's design drawings allowed use of the drawings after the architect was
removed from project). Even worse, the very existence of a license may become
subject to dispute. See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 556-58 (recognizing the
existence of an implied license as applied to a special effects film footage); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 626 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(analyzing whether Microsoft had granted an implied license to Hewlett Packard
of visual displays from Windows 1.0), aff'd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). As Judge Kozinski noted in the Effects
Associatesopinion,"[c]ommon sense tells us that agreements should routinely be
put in writing.. . . Rather than look to the court every time they disagree as to
whether a particular use of the work violates their mutual understanding, parties
need only look to the writing .... " Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557.
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complex licensing arrangements, such as those required to operate
networking software, a written explanation of rights is essential to
understanding the relationship62between the parties and the range of
rights available to each party.
The utility of written agreements is far from a novel idea.
Contract law reflects a deep-rooted policy favoring written
agreements because they are informative and they help record the
contract terms. Although the Uniform Commercial Code has "gap
filling" provisions that operate in the absence of written terms,63
the preferred mode of contracting for the sale or lease of goods is
by written agreement.' Under the statute of frauds, for example,
whether a contract exists at all may depend on the existence of a
written record.65 Where items of value are at stake, the law often
requires a written instrument.66 Additionally, in copyright law.
an assignment of a copyright,67 an exclusive copyright license,68

62. Although we argue that EULAs are valuable for many software
transactions, each software product should be evaluated on its own merits.
Undoubtedly, cases will exist in which selling the software product under the
doctrine of first sale is, on balance, the best business model.
63. See, e.g., Mark E. Roszkowski & John D. Wladis, RevisedUC.C.Section
2-207: Analysis and Recommendations,Bus. LAW., May 1994, at 1065, 1067-70
(extolling the merits of gap-fillers for U.C.C. § 2-207).
64. See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557 ("Common sense tells us that
agreements should routinely be put in writing .... "); cf Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 97, 101-06 (1989) (advocating penalizing interpretations of
contracts to encourage parties to write all terms into their contracts).
65. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1995) (requiring a contract for the sale of
goods with a price of $500 or more to be in writing); U.C.C. § 2A-201(1)
(requiring a lease contract with total payments to be made in excess of $1000 to
be in writing).
66. For example, a writing is required for many real estate transactions. See
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2195.04(A)(2)(b) (1992); CAL. Crv. CODE § 1624(c)
(West 1985); In re Estate of Kirk, 907 P.2d 794, 801 (Idaho 1995); Luloff v.
Blackburn, 906 P.2d 189, 191 (Mont. 1995).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (requiring written transfers of copyright);
Konigsberg Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 356 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring a
transfer of the rights associated with a copyright to be in writing even though the
parties had entered a joint venture).
68. Konigsberg, 16 F.3d at 357 (holding that letters from an author to movie
producers were not sufficient to meet the writing requirement to be considered an
exclusive writing pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)).
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and an agreement reversing the presumptions under the "work for
hire" doctrine6 9 must all be in writing to be valid.
Moreover, EULAs actually inform the end user of the terms and
conditions of the transaction better than many other consumer
contracts today7" and have the potential to do so even better in the
future. Software publishers generally strive to bring the EULA to
the user's attention in a meaningful fashion, because they want to
define the parameters of the rights being granted. 7'
C.

EULAs Allow Software Publishersto Offer a Rich Variety of

Rights
Software publishers use EULAs to provide a certain desirable
package of rights to customers at the lowest possible price.72

69. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work made for hire as "(1) a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a
work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work"); Id.§ 201(b) (stating that, unless otherwise agreed to in a written, signed
agreement, "the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author . . . and ... owns all of the rights comprised in the

copyright"); Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 745
(1989) (noting that Congress clearly intended "work for hire" agreements to be in
writing).
70. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law
and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 595 (1990) (noting
that consumer form contracts are often drafted with the knowledge and intent that
they will not be read).
71. Moreover, two of the central purposes of the EULA are to inform the end
user of what rights he or she does not have under copyright and to deter
unauthorized use of the software. See supra notes 46, 56-58 and accompanying
text. These purposes are defeated if the EULA is hidden from the end user. If
the EULA is to prevent unauthorized uses and copying of the software, it is in the
best interest of the software publisher to notify the end user of the conduct which
is unauthorized. Broad deterrence of unauthorized use is critical because the
licensor could recover little from each individual licensee's breach or infringement. See Page M. Kaufman, Note, The EnforceabilityofState "Shrink Wrap"
License Statutes in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 222, 234 n.88 (1988) (stating that manufacturers rely on "shrink-wrap"
license agreements to protect their property rights in copyrighted software, and
thus avoid the difficulty of proving copyright infringement on a case by case
basis); see also Marenberg & Brown, supra note 2, at 8 (describing a licensor's
contract remedies).
72. See I FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, § 4.26 (stating that "[s]ince standard
forms can be tailored to fit office routines and mechanical equipment, they
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Standardized software terms also allow publishers to withhold
rights which may be of marginal value to most end users, but
which are particularly costly or risky to the software publisher if
Selling software under the doctrine of first
granted."
sale-similar to a newspaper publisher selling a newspaper-simply does not allow for the required flexibility of contract
terms. The doctrine of first sale is, in effect, a one-size-fits-all
transaction model.74 Copyright, patent, and trade secret law alone
do not allow for enough specificity and variability in end users'
rights and accompanying obligations to suit the diversity of
software products and use patterns that customers desire.75

simplify operations and reduce costs").
73. See O'Rourke, supranote 9, at 516 ("[I]t is questionable whether the end
user wishes to purchase anything more than the functionality that is obtained by
running the object code."); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAs ULEN, LAW AND
ECONoMics 25-26 (1988) (explaining that the optimum point of production is
where the marginal cost of production equals the marginal benefit derived from
production). The consumer market forces the creator to make a product which is
useful to consumers because consumers will not purchase a product which is of
no utility to them. See COOTER & ULEN, supra, at 25-26. Consumers make a
similar judgment for each additional benefit or right offered by the producer. See
id. Therefore, if the cost of an extra right (the marginal cost of production)
exceeds the benefit to the consumer (the marginal benefit), then including the
extra right is inefficient for both the consumer and the producer because the
consumer would be asked-and may possibly refuse--to pay a higher price for
a product that he or she does not value any more highly. See id
74. See supranote 59 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of first
sale). In this context, the doctrine of first sale is both underinclusive and
overinclusive for the end user. See supranote 73 (discussing marginal cost and
marginal benefit). For example, the first sale doctrine may be underinclusive
because it would not allow rights to copy and distribute clip art provided by some
software publishers. See infra note 79. At the same time, the first sale doctrine
is overinclusive because it provides some rights which are unnecessary to the
customer, such as the right to decompile the product. See infra note 91 and
accompanying text.
75. See David P. Chernicoff, NT Client Licensing: Flexibilityand Gotchas,
PC WK., May 15, 1995, at N 18 (noting that the per-server licensing model allows
a license to be assigned to either the clients or the servers); Marenberg & Brown,
supra note 2, at 9 ("Both users and vendors have reason to move away from
antiquated types of licensing toward software licenses that reduce administrative
burdens, permit flexibility in use, and assure both vendor and user of a fair
bargain."); see also Paul, supra note 40, at 24 ("Flexibility is perhaps the most
important characteristic in software-licensing agreements today.").
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EULAs Are Often Rights-Expanding

EULAs often provide users with more rights than the users
would be entitled to if they simply purchased a copy of the
software. For example, some software publishers permit end users
to make and use a second copy of a licensed program on the users'
home or laptop computers.7 6 Many desktop publishing and word
processing products include licenses to copy and distribute fonts,
and to copy and make derivative works using clip art and other
images provided as part of the product."
EULAs for software development kits (such as Microsoft's
Win32 SDK), database products (such as Borland's dBASE and
Paradox, and Microsoft's FoxPro and Access), and language
products (such as Borland's Turbo C/C++ and Microsoft's Visual
Basic) often grant the user rights to copy and distribute certain
binary files, and to make, copy, and distribute derivative works
developed from certain sample source code."
Publishers of
Internet browser software typically permit users to freely copy and
distribute such software.79 Some software publishers grant users
the right to put an extra copy of the software on a server that is

76. See William H. Neukum & Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Licensing Rights
to Computer Software, TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION, 775, 778
(Practicing Law Institute 1993); the current EULA for Adobe Systems;the current
EULA for Symantec. End users normally are confined to making only "essential
step" copies and copies for archival purposes. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(l); supranote
51 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., the EULA for Microsoft's Video for Windows; the EULA for
ART b la Carte;the EULA for ClipPix ("copies of images, in digital form (but
not printed form), may be incorporated into up to 10,000 individual product copies
made by you ... and may be distributed as part of your Products").
78. See Carroll, supra note 23, at 1345 (anticipating increasingly complex
standard user licenses for development tool products).
79. See the EULA for Microsoft's InternetExplorer;the EULA for NetScape
Navigator; see also Angela Hickman, Explore Anywhere, PC MAG., Mar. 12,
1996, at 118 (noting that the test version of the software program Explore
Anywhere is available free of charge); Gary W. Kaplow, On-Line Clip Art, PC
MAG., Feb. 26, 1991, at 50 (reviewing software which allows end users to
incorporate the contents into their own works); Joel Shurkin, Jim Clark'sNetscape
Play, INTERACTIvE AGE, Dec. 12, 1994, at 55 (describing the free distribution of
Netscape Navigator).
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used to install the software on computers over a local area
network.80 Licensors of networking products often grant broad
rights which allow the copying of client software which works with
their server software.8 '
EULAs are also an efficient mechanism for providing multiple
copies of software to end users. Publishers often employ "license
packs," in which an end user can acquire one copy of a software
program along with a license card authorizing reproduction of a
given number of additional copies.82 This innovation enables
small businesses and others to acquire, for example, ten copies of
a word processing program in an off-the-shelf transaction without
being burdened with or required to pay for ten sets of packaging
and manuals which would add unnecessary costs to the transaction.
2.

Varied Uses and Intellectual Property Protection of
Software Products

Traditional copyrighted works-such as books--have relatively
specific, limited uses. Software programs, however, can be put to
a variety of uses. In many cases, software is more akin to a tool
than a book or videotape. For example, software can be used to
sort data, draw, paint, perform calculations, create documents, and
develop other software programs. Contracting by EULA can take
account of this complexity.
Copyright law is the sole protection for most traditional works
of authorship. Software, in contrast, is protected by copyright,
patent, trade secret, and trademark law.83 Use of a single soft-

80. See the EULA for Microsoft's Windows 95; see also, e.g., Quarterdeck's
CleanSweeps Window Uninstaller, NEWSBYTES NEW NETWoRK, Oct. 19, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, PCNEWS database ("CleanSweep includes a network
uninstall module free with each copy of the program. This module allows uninstall
to operate on both the server and the workstations.").
81. See the Server License for Microsoft Server Software; the EULA for
Novell's NetWare 4.X.
82. See the EULA for Microsoft's Windows 95 ("If you have acquired this
EULA in a Microsoft License Pak, you may make the number of additional copies
of the software portion of the SOFTWARE PRODUCT authorized on the printed
copy of this EULA ... .
83. Id. at 251.
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ware program may require a copyright license, a patent license, a
trade secret license (for source code), and a trademark license. 4
Software's versatility and legal complexity distinguish it from
traditional copyrighted materials. Software, therefore, requires the
flexibility of the EULA to allow for the full range of customer
uses.

Contract Variety: For Better,Not for Worse
Some critics of EULAs argue against the ability to offer a
package of license rights rather than the statutory "first sale" rights
because, they claim, EULAs permit software publishers to take
valuable rights away from end users.85 A common criticism of
software publishers is that their EULAs prohibit reverse engineer3.

ing,"' decompilation, 87 and disassembly 8 of their software.

9

84. See, e.g., Einhom, Box-Top Licenses, supra note 2, at 403 (noting that
EULAs often contain provisions precluding the buyer from using the software for
any purpose other than operating the program).
85. See id at 404-06 (examining three possible contract interpretations of
EULAs).
86. Reverse engineering is:
A method of analyzing a product in which the finished item is studied
to determine its makeup or component parts, typically for the purpose
of creating a copy or a competitive product-for example, studying a
completed ROM chip to determine its programming or studying a new
computer system to learn about its design.
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 340 (2d ed. 1994); see also Julie E. Cohen, Reverse
Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property
Implicationsof "Lock-Out" Programs,68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1094-95 (1995)
(discussing the use of lock-out programs to prevent reverse engineering of
software).
87. A "decompiler" is defined as "[a] program that takes assembly language
code or machine code and attempts to generate high-level source code from it-a
difficult task because it is possible to write assembly code for which there is no
corresponding high-level source code." COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 86,
at 114.
88. A "disassembler" is defined as "[a] program that converts machine code
to assembly language source code. Most debuggers have some kind of built-in
disassembler, allowing the programmer to view an executable program in terms
of human-readable assembly language." Id. at 124-25. "Disassembly" or "decompilation" is a method which parses software in binary object code form to discover
the higher-level, human readable commands. Cohen, supra note 86, at 1094-95.
89. Others have criticized EULAs for purportedly eliminating software users'
fair use rights. See generally Lemley, supra note 2, at 1274-83. It is doubtful
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Software publishers typically restrict these activities because they
risk exposing, and hence losing, to the public domain, the
publisher's crown jewel-the secrets contained in the software's
source code.90 Most purchasers of off-the-shelf software, however, care little, if at all, about the right to reverse engineer, and they
certainly are not interested in paying more money to acquire this
right. 9' The entities that are most interested in acquiring this right
are competitors of the software developer.9 2 A competitor should

that the mere presence of a EULA constrains fair use rights generally, as opposed
to a particular, enumerated use mentioned in a EULA, such as reverse engineering. See discussion infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text (stating why
limiting the most commonly mentioned potential fair use in the context of
software-reverse engineering-is reasonable). To our knowledge, no EULA
contains a provision that flatly prohibits all copyright fair uses.
Commentators have also criticized EULAs for preventing the user from
transferring to another party the copy of the software that the user has licensed.
Most modern EULAs specifically permit such transfers. See, e.g., the current
EULAs for Microsoft's Windows 95, Visual Basic, Office, and BackOfice;
IBM's OS/2; Lotus' SmartSuite;Borland's Turbo C/C++ and dBASE; and Apple's
Macintosh System 7. Compare Lemley, supra note 2, at 1268 (citing a 1980's
vintage EULA from Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.
1988), in support of his critique), with Hemnes, supranote 2, at 586 n.61 ("There
is a trend toward provisions allowing transfer of the licenses of 'off the shelf
software."). ButseeOracleCorporation's End User Program License. If a EULA
does constrain transferability in some way, however, "giving up" this right often
permits the software publisher to charge a lower price for the software or provide
some other rights which may actually be more valuable to the user. For example,
many software companies offer low-priced academic editions of their products,
which are licensed for use only by qualified academic users. See supranote 7681 and accompanying text.
90. See generally Ronald L. Johnston & Allen R. Grogan, Trade Secret
Protectionfor Mass DistributedSoftware, COMPUTER LAW., Nov. 1994, at I
(discussing the protection of source code under trade secret law); O'Rourke, supra
note 9, at 497, 509, 524.
91. See O'Rourke, supranote 9, at 516 (stating that the average user is not
interested in anything more than running the software); cf.Lemley, supranote 2,
at 1294 n.103 (opining that, while most purchasers do not intend to engage in
reverse engineering, it is an "open question" as to whether they expect to have
that option when they purchase the program). The marginal benefit of conferring
the right to reverse engineer the software to an end user is not worth the
additional cost to grant such a benefit. See supranote 73 and accompanying text
(discussing marginal cost and marginal benefit).
92. Though software publishers diligently guard access to the secrets inherent
in their source code, gaining such access has not, historically, been integral for
competitors to achieve success in the personal computer software market. Success
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not be permitted to acquire the right to examine a company's trade

secrets for the low price that the typical end user pays for the
software.
In the view of some commentators, however, reverse engineering
is an inalienable right. From this perspective, they argue that
reverse engineering rights should not be impaired by contract,
including through EULAs.93 Such a debate is complex, and a
detailed response is beyond the scope of this Article.94 The

has been achieved by advancing the state of the art, by offering a next-generation
product, not simply by replicating or slightly improving the current product
offerings. For example, Microsoft's Excel and Wordwere able to surpass Lotus'
Lotus 1-2-3 and Wordperfect's WordPerfectin spreadsheets and word processing,
respectively, by moving the software paradigm from character-based to graphical
user interface. See, e.g., Hailey Lynne McKeefry, 1995 Readers'ChoiceAwards,
WINDOWS MAG., Sept. 1, 1995, at 178. Windows NT Server is challenging
NetWare,the long-time leader in networking software, primarily because Windows
NTServeroperatesmore effectively as an application server, while also providing
the file and print capabilities NetWarehas traditionally provided. Michael Surkan,
NetWare SMP Can't Keep Up, PC WK., Apr. 1, 1996, at 88-89; see also George
Gilder, The Coming Software Shift, FORBES, Aug. 28, 1995, at 147, 162
(discussing the progress of various software products and the advent of Netscape 's
Navigator in particular); Stephanie Lapolla & Norvin Leach, Managers Lean
Toward NT in Mapping EnterprisePlans, PC WK., May 13, 1996, at 1 (noting
that Windows NT's rise in popularity is due, in large part, to the addition of
improved fault tolerance and scalability).
93. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, ReverseEngineeringofSoftware: Separating
Legal Mythology from Actual Technology, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 331, 333 (1992)
(arguing that a reverse engineerer makes use only of ideas and processes contained
within a program-acts which are always permissible under copyright law).
94. For discussions of this topic, see generally Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, Law, and Creativityin DigitalArts,
19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 903 (1994); Johnson-Laird, supra note 93; Andrew
Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineeringin the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 843 (1994); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer
Documents, Reverse Engineeringand ProfessorMiller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv.
975 (1994); Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs,
Databases, and Computer-GeneratedWorks, 106 HARv. L. REv. 977 (1993);
O'Rourke, supra note 9; David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and
Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License ProhibitionsAgainst
Reverse Engineering,53 U. PITT. L. REv. 543 (1992); David A. Rice, Sega and
Beyond: A Beaconfor Fair Use Analysis.. . at Least as Faras it Goes, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 1131 (1994); Gary R. Ignatin, Comment, Let the HackersHack:
Allowing the Reverse Engineeringof CopyrightedComputerProgramsto Achieve
Compatibility,140 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1992); Timothy S. Teter, Note, Merger
and the Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-CompatibilityTrend in Computer
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position of these critics assumes that the information generated by
reverse engineering would never be available but for legislative
intervention in the end user licensing process.9 5 Industry practice
is to the contrary.9 6 EULAs are not the final word on achieving
access to source code or other important proprietary information.97
Most personal computer software publishers offer source code
licenses, but not pursuant to the limited terms or at the low prices
of off-the-shelf software. 9 Source code licenses are far more
detailed than the ordinary EULA because these licenses pertain to
sensitive information that may represent a company's most valuable
business asset.99 Source code licensees typically receive not only
the software source code, but also programmers' comments, other
documentation, various tools such as debuggers and build tools,

Software Cases, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1061 (1993).
95. See generally Johnson-Laird, supra note 94.

96. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
97. In fact, decompiled code may be of limited utility. See Johnson-Laird,
supra note 94, at 843 n.4, 899 (stating that "reverse engineering cannot tell
whether a given feature is required for current or future compatibility" and that
decompiled code lacks valuable source code comments and other information);
Pamela Samuelson et al., Symposium: A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protectionof Computer Programs,94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2336 n.90 (1994)

(stating that reverse engineering does not allow for the recreation of mnemonic
names for variables and procedures chosen by the programmer, which often make
it clear what each piece of the code is doing).
It is also important to know the information that people seek through reverse
engineering or decompilation. Most often, people seek information regarding
programming techniques, information necessary for debugging or customizing the
program, and information that could be used to create an interoperable or a
competing product. Charles R. McManis, IntellectualProperty in the United
States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25, 30-31 (1993); see

also Cohen, supranote 86, at 1093-95; O'Rourke, supra note 9, at 498 (stressing
that access may be required to "understand underlying ideas, to produce a
compatible product, or to fix bugs"). Bearing these purposes in mind, important
proprietary information is readily available for all these purposes, see discussion
infranotes 99-104, with the likely exception of information specifically disclosed
to enable a competitor to create a clone of the underlying software product, see
supra notes 91-92.
98. See O'Rourke, supranote9, at 493-94, 494 n.57 (listing various examples

of how source code can be obtained).
99. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the value of the
software's source code).
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Source code licenses

usually contain a very specific scope of license, describe confidentiality obligations in detail, and offer a different pricing structure
Software publishers
than that for off-the-shelf software.'
license source code for many commercial purposes for a flat fee or
under various royalty structures.' °2 Additionally, many software
publishers offer low or no cost source code licenses to universities
for educational and research purposes or to third parties for
achieving interoperability or performing software maintenance.'
Most significantly, publishers of personal computer system
software usually provide functional access to their products at no
charge through application programming interfaces ("APIs"), so
that no source code licensing is necessary'0 4 Microsoft's Windows and Windows NT, Apple's Macintosh, and IBM's OS/2
operating systems all follow this model, as do other system
software platform products such as Lotus' Notes and Novell's Net-

Ware." 5 The publishers of these products not only distribute the

100. See Johnson-Laird, supra note 94, at 843 n.4 (pointing out that
decompiled code lacks valuable source code comments and other information);
Samuelson, supra note 97, at 2336 n.90 (noting that decompiled code lacks
mnemonic names chosen by programmers for variables and procedures).
101. See O'Rourke, supranote 9, at 494 ("[l1n some circumstances, software
providers also license the source code to customers, usually for maintenance
purposes and under strict confidentiality terms.").
102. See id. at 494 n.57 (describing a variety of pricing arrangements for
obtaining source code); see also Softel, Inc., v. Dragon Medical & Scientific
Communications, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 935, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (illustrating that
source code licenses can cost more than $17,000).
103. See generallyO'Rourke, supra note 9, at 493-500.
104. In addition, many software publishers do business in Europe and therefore
must comply with the European Software Directive which permits, in many cases,
reverse engineering to achieve interoperability. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 91/250/EEC
ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE PROGRAMS, ARTICLE

6 (May 14,

1991). The Directive does not permit software publishers to opt out of the
Directive by contract. Id.; see the EULA for Microsoft's Windows 95 ("You may
not reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble the SOFTWARE PRODUCT,
except and only to the extent that such activity is expressly permitted by
applicable law notwithstanding this limitation.").
105. Software publishers also offer compatibility logos (such as the Designed
For Windows 95 logo, the Yes It Runs With NetWare logo, the Notes Ready logo,
and the MicrosoftOfficeCompatible logo) which may be licensed by independent
software vendors for use on the vendor's products to tout their compatibility with
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APIs, but they also publish development kits and employ "technical
evangelists" to make it easy for applications developers to write for
their platforms. Obtaining the support of these applications
developers is critical to the success of a personal computer
operating system product,1 6 and support of these developers is
achieved by readily providing tools and information about how to
interoperate with the system software.' O7
The most important point, though, is that most endusers would
not be willing to spend additional money for the right to reverse
engineer. The law should not force mass market software
publishers to burden the price of their software by requiring
publishers to offer rights which most users are not interested in
acquiring.
IV. EULAs: EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE FUTURE
As described above, licensing is a beneficial way to provide
software to the mass market today. The importance of licensing
will be even more pronounced for the information products of the
future.
A. Information Products on the World Wide Web
The Internet and World Wide Web are making the publication
of information and distribution of software easier than at any time

the given software platform.
106. See Norvin Leach, Novell Touts Servicesfor Developers, PC WK., Apr. 5,
1993, at 147 (stating that "Novell's goal is to make it as easy as possible for
developers to write applications to squeeze the most value of NetWare"); Julie
Pitta, MajorChanges OrderedinIBM's Organization, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995,
at 1 (stating that the lack of developer support damaged OS/2's marketability);
Ben Rothke, OS/2 is Dead-LongLive Reigning Microsoft Windows, LAN TIMEs,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 82 ("The dearth of applications designed for OS/2 is primarily
what contributed to its downfall."); Sean Silverthome, Baby, Come Back, PC WK.,
Oct. 2, 1995, at Al.
107. See HELEN CusTER, INSIDE WINDOWS NT (1991) (explaining the
architecture of Windows N7); ADRIAN KING, INSIDE WINDOWS 95 (1995)
(explaining the architecture of Windows 95). In addition, most of the important
"wire protocols" which are used by personal computer-based networking products,
such as TCP/IP,NetBeui, and IPX/SPX, are publicly documented so that software
publishers can achieve interoperability among networks.
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in the past.'0 8 The costs and barriers to entry are becoming
lower every day for entrepreneurs who would like to make a
business of providing information or distributing software via the
"information superhighway."' 9 Many observers are predicting
that the day will soon arrive when customers will license compact
software applications (often called "applets") designed to perform
discrete tasks, rather than acquiring multi-feature, general purpose
software applications." 0 These applets will be developed by
scores of small software developers who have the ability to reach
the mass market by means of the World Wide Web."' Similarly,
the "friction free" distribution potential of the World Wide Web
will permit authors of all types of works to publish and distribute
their works to a wide audience."'
This explosion in the variety of information products which
publishers can distribute via the World Wide Web will significantly
increase the need for contract flexibility. The low cost of distribution on the World Wide Web will allow publishers to experiment
with many packages of user rights and prices. For example, the
author of a game program may license the game for use in hourly
increments, and vary pricing depending on the level of difficulty
which the user chooses, perhaps making the lowest skill level free
and charging the most for the expert skill level. The author of a
multimedia program may license the program to individual students
and home users free of charge, but might charge a fee to an
educational institution or corporation. That same author may be
willing to license a "text and still picture only" version of the
product at one price and a version with video and audio fully

108. See Lance Rose, The Emperor'sClothes Still FitJust Fine, WIRED, Feb.
1995, at 103 (describing the challenges of distributing copyrighted works on the

web).
109. See GATES, supra note 41, at 157-83.
110. See Amy Cortese & John Verity, The Software Revolution, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 4, 1995, at 78, 78-90 (noting that the Java language has popularized "object
technology," which enables smaller programs to perform discrete tasks).
111. See Gilder, supranote 92, at 147-62; Cortese & Verity, supra note 110,
at 82. But see Gordon Bell, George Gilder and His Critics,FORBES, Oct. 9, 1995,
at 165, 181 (presenting a variety of evaluations by leaders of the software industry

of Mr. Gilder's assertions, with varying conclusions).
112. See Gilder, supra note 92, at 147-62.
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enabled for another price. Copyright law's doctrine of first sale
will be too blunt an instrument for these authors to use for
"selling" their works." 3 License agreements are the form of
contract that can provide the flexibility that will be required for
doing business on the information superhighway." 4

B., Client-Server Computing
Other developments are also elevating the importance of
licensing. In many instances, personal computer software has
become powerful enough to replace mainframe and mini computer
software. Presently, powerful server software running on a
personal computer or a group of personal computers can often
provide the same computing power and functionality as a mainThe developers of
frame computer at a fraction of the cost.'
personal computer-based server software are using mass market
distribution channels to distribute this software, even though the
rights being granted to users of server software are more complex
than those granted for the typical desktop application product." 6
Without the EULA, a publisher of personal computer-based server
software would not be able to explain the varied rights and
limitations appropriate for client-server computing, while at the
same time making use of mass -market distribution." 7
For example, Microsoft Corporation licenses a suite of server
applications known as the BackOffice Suite."' This product

113. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (describing the first sale
doctrine and its applicability to software).
114. See John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Davids, Web-Site Agreements Do
Not Wrap Up IP Rights, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at C3 (describing use of
EULAs on World Wide Web sites).
115. See generally G.P. ZACHARY, SHOW-STOPPER!. THE BREAKNECK RACE
TO CREATE WINDOWS NT AND THE NEXT GENERATION AT MICROSOFT (1994).

116. Compare the EULA for Microsoft BackOffice with the EULA for
Microsoft Office.
117. See Ted S. Bowen, Making Sure the Price is Right: Developers Work on
Software Licensing Models to Address Usage in DistributedEnvironments, PC
WK., Nov. 7, 1994, at 22 (discussing the advantages of a two-tiered licensing
system); Greguras & Wong, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing the necessity for
EULAs in mass marketed software).
118. See generally Christine Bums, Museum Makes an Art of Using Windows
NT, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 7, 1994, at Li (describing the various server
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contains the Windows NT Server operating system, the SQL Server
database "back end," the SNA Server gateway to IBM mainframe
computers, the Systems Management Server network management
9
The
tool, and the Exchange Server messaging platform."
EULA for the BackOffice Suite permits the end user to copy the
accompanying client software onto all workstations in the user's
enterprise. 20 The same EULA permits the user to choose from
two models for utilizing the server software: the user may acquire
an "access license" for each workstation that will utilize the server
software,121 or the user may instead acquire "access licenses"
based on the maximum number of simultaneous connections the
12 2
Without
user anticipates it will make to the server software.
the EULA, it would be difficult and costly to offer these customerdriven choices in the mass market.
C.

The Boom of Multimedia Products

The proliferation of multimedia software has also made licensing
23
Multimedia
more important to software publishers and users.
software products contain various works of authorship, which the
user can often copy, modify, and redistribute as part of the user's
work. 24 The works in a multimedia product may have been
acquired by the software developer from third-party sources.
However, the rights the software publisher may be able to acquire
or choose to grant for the various works within its product often
vary from work to work. 25 For example, a software product that
allows the user to create movies may contain sample video clips,

applications licensed by Microsoft).
119. See the Server License for MicrosoftServer Products.
120. See id
121. See id
122. See Client Access License for Microsoft Server Products.
123. See MICHAEL D. ScoTr, MULTIMEDIA: LAW & PRACTICE § 1.02 (1993);
Allen R. Grogan, Acquiring Contentfor New Media Works, COMPuTER LAW.,

Jan. 1991, at 2 (discussingthe development of the multimedia market and various
issues it has created).
124. See generallyGrogan, supra note 123.
125. Seeid. For examples of various multimedia systemsand their capabilities,
see generally Henry

Fersko-Weiss, Mighty Multimedia Machines; Seven

Multimedia Microcomputers,COMPUTER SHOPPER, Aug. 1993, at 158.
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scripts, music, pictures, and other items for the user to work with
as a Starting point for making a movie. The software publisher
may be able to secure only limited rights from the copyright
26
owners of the musical composition and of the sound recording.
The software publisher would have to limit the use of the music
accordingly, and the best way to inform the user of such limitations
is with a EULA.
To make things even more complex, some multimedia products
are'now distributed on CD-ROMs that can link to related information located on the Internet or other on-line networks."27 As a
result, the end user receives almost seamless access to content from
two different distribution channels--CD-ROM and online---although the materials found in the on-line component may
or may not originate with the CD-ROM's publisher.t28 License
terms must spell out the varying rights the end user receives to
these components of a "virtual product."
. These are just a few examples of today's software technologies.
New technologies that we can now barely imagine will be
developed in the future. License agreements, with their inherent
flexibility and power to inform, provide the best means for
facilitating this commerce of the future.

126. See the EULA for ClickART Famous Magazine Cartoons (containing a
complex grant of rights to artwork owned by Sandhill Arts and its licensing
artists). See generally ScOTr, supra note 123 (surveying multimedia licensing
issues for the developing market).
127. See Denise Caruso, Microsoft Morphs Into a Media Company, WIRED,
June 1992, at 126, 192 (noting that Microsoft's Encarta,Cinemania,and Music
Central are licensed so that they can be updated via the Microsoft Network,
Microsoft's on-line network).
128. For example, users of Microsoft's EncartaCD-ROM encyclopedia may
access current events information published on the Microsoft Network on-line
service. The product could also contain links to on-line newspapers published by
third parties or various World Wide Web sites which contain pertinent information
on a range of topics. The Microsoft Complete Baseball CD-ROM product
provides access to on-line daily baseball scores and statistics provided by a third

party.
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V. WORK TO BE DONE
While EULAs are valuable tools, the challenge for software
lawyers is to make them even more beneficial. The increasing
ability to present EULAs on computer screens presents an excellent
opportunity to improve the readability of EULAs and access to
licensing information.' 29 Neither software publishers nor end
users, however, will be well-served if licensing lawyers simply
convert their existing paper EULAs to electronic EULAs.
Using simple, clear, and concise language is an ongoing
challenge for software lawyers. Contract terms expressed in dense
legalese make it difficult for the EULA to provide useful information to the end user and to provide effective warnings against
piracy. While technology cannot correct poor writing (although
some software can identify it), license agreements presented "on
screen" can use color, a rich variety of typefaces and fonts,
interactive user interfaces, and other presentation techniques to
Software publishers
make EULAs more readable and "alive."
using electronic licenses can also provide links to "help files,"
World Wide Web sites, or video presentations that could elaborate
on the terms set out in the EULA or provide answers to frequently
asked questions. Automated software "wizards" could even help
end users assemble a license to fit their desired purposes, 3 ' and

calculate the corresponding license fee. Many other possibilities
exist for the creative presentation of EULAs. Lawyers simply need
to recognize that they are no longer limited to squeezing the EULA
onto a small license card or one page in a user's manual.
VI.

CONCLUSION

EULAs are a valuable contracting tool because they provide vital
information and rights to software users, and because they permit
the contracting flexibility that is essential for today's software
products. The importance of EULAs will only increase over time
129. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
130. For example, details could be addressed such as whether the user wants
to distribute parts of a "run-time" software product, or to install and use the
software on a computer network with multiple users.
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as information products proliferate and more people join the "online" world. Rather than abandon EULAs, software lawyers should
apply their creativity and use technology to improve EULAs to suit
the information age.

